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We know from [8], that for a single object second price auction, the equilibrium
bids for the case with a known number of bidders are the same as those for the case of
an uncertain number of bidders – i.e., in both cases the bidders bid truthfully. On the
basis of this result, we derive the equilibrium bids for sequential second price auctions
as follows.
Consider the last auction. Since the equilibrium bids for this auction for the case
withaknownnumberofbiddersarethesameasthoseforcasewithanunknownnumber
of bidders [8], the winner’s expected proﬁt, the expected surplus, and the expected
revenue are obtained from Equations 4, 5, and 6:
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We now reasonbackwardsto obtainthe bids forthe previousauctions.Before doing
so, we introduce some notation. Let N be an m element vector where Nj denotes the
numberofbiddersinauctionj.Also,let  3(j;m;N)denoteabidder’sex-anteexpected
proﬁt from winning any one auction in the series from auction j to auction m when the
number of bidders in each of these auctions is as given in N. Let  3(y;j;m;N) be a
bidder’s ex-ante probability of winning auction y in the series of auctions from j to m,
if the numberof biddersin each auctionis as givenin N. For the case wherethe number
of bidders is not known for the individual auctions, we let 3(j;m) denote a bidder’s
ex-ante expected proﬁt from winning an auction in the series from j to m. Then we get
the following equations:
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 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where  3(m + 1;m;N) = 0 and  EP 3(y;m;N) is:
 EP 3(y;m;N) = E(fNy
y )   E(sNy
y ) +  3(y + 1;m;N)
Since the number of bidders for each auction lies between 1 and n, it follows that
3(m   1;m) is:
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and 5, it is straightforward to obtain the equilibrium bids for S4 as follows:
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  3(y;j;m;N) (21)
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As in Section 5, we get the following outcome for this scenario:
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Since  4(y;j;m;N)   3(y;j;m;N)(seeEquation21)and  EP 4(y;m;N)   EP 3(y;m;N)
(see Equation 22) it follows that:
4(j;m)  3(j;m): (24)
Hence EP 4(j;m)  EP 3(j;m) and ER4(j;m)  ER3(j;m). In order to compare
4 and 2, we need to take PN(1;n) = 1. Then, it is straightforward to see that
4(j;m)  2(j;m;n): (25)